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Abstract 
We describe the research findings that link intelligence and personality traits with health 
outcomes: health behaviors, morbidity, and mortality. The former field is called cognitive 
epidemiology, and the latter is known as personological epidemiology. However, intelligence and 
personality traits are the principal research topics studied by differential psychologists, and so the 
combined field might be termed differential epidemiology. The importance of bringing this field 
to wider attention lies in the facts that: the findings overviewed here are relatively new, often 
known neither to researchers or practitioners; the effect sizes are on a par with better-known, 
traditional risk factors for illness and death, so they should be broadcast as important; 
mechanisms of the associations are largely unknown, so they must be explored further; and the 
findings have yet to be applied, so we write this to encourage diverse interested parties to 
consider how this might be done. 
 
To make the work accessible to as many relevant researchers, practitioners, policy makers and 
laypersons as possible, we first provide an overview of the basic discoveries regarding 
intelligence and personality. In both of these areas we describe the nature and structure of the 
measured phenotypes. Both are well established even though we recognize that this is not always 
appreciated beyond the cognoscenti. Human intelligence differences are well described by a 
hierarchy that includes general intelligence (g) at the pinnacle, strongly correlated broad domains 
of cognitive functioning at a lower level, and specific abilities at the foot. The major human 
differences in personality are described by five personality factor that attract wide consensus with 
respect to their number and nature: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. As a foundation for the health-related findings, we provide a summary of the 
research which shows that intelligence and personality differences are: measured reliably and 
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validly; stable traits across many years, even decades; substantially heritable; related to important 
life outcomes. Cognitive and personality traits are fundamental aspects of the person that have 
relevance to life chances and outcomes; and here we discuss health outcomes. 
 
There is an overview of the major and mostly recent research that has studied associations 
between intelligence and personality traits and health outcomes. These outcomes include 
mortality from all causes, specific causes of death, specific illnesses, and other health outcomes 
including health-related behaviors. Intelligence and personality traits are significantly and 
substantially (by comparison with traditional risk factors) related to all of these. The studies we 
describe are unusual in psychology: mostly they are larger in sample sizes (typically thousands of 
subjects, and sometimes around one million), the samples are more representative of the 
background population, the follow-up times are long (sometimes many decades, almost the whole 
human lifespan), and the outcomes are objective health measures (including death) not just self-
reports. In addition to the associations, possible mechanisms for the associations are described 
and discussed, and some attempts to test these are illustrated. It is relatively early in this research 
field, and so much remains to be done here. 
 
Finally, some preliminary remarks are made about possible applications. These are made in the 
knowledge that the psychological predictors addressed are somewhat stable aspects of the person, 
with substantial genetic causes. Nevertheless, the view taken is that this does not preclude useful 
interventions that can make wider appreciation of differential epidemiology a useful component 
of interventions to improve individual and public health. Intelligence and personality differences 
are the loci of later health inequalities; to the extent that it is possible, the eventual aim of 
cognitive and personological epidemiology is to reduce or eliminate these inequalities and 
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provide information that helps people toward their own optimal health through the life course. 
We offer up these findings to a wider audience so that: more associations will be explored; a 
better understanding of the mechanisms of health inequalities will be produced; and inventive 
applications will ensue based on what we hope will become to be seen practically useful 
knowledge.
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1. Intelligence and personality traits 
Humans differ from each other. Not just in physical characteristics, like sex, height, weight, hair 
and eye color, facial attractiveness, and so on. People also differ in their psychological make-up. 
This monograph addresses a research area in the fields of health psychology and psychosomatic 
medicine, namely how prominent human individual differences in the psychological traits of 
intelligence and personality are associated with death, illness, and other aspects of health such as 
health behaviors (e.g., smoking and diet, including alcohol intake). Before that, for the readers 
who are not psychologists working in these fields, we describe and explain the nature of these 
traits. Similarly, for readers who are not epidemiologists, we also introduce some key concepts in 
that field. Both intelligence and personality are topics within psychology which, from the outside, 
could seem to be mired in controversy and disagreements about even the most basic facts. This is 
far from the truth of the matter. In both intelligence and personality research there are core 
discoveries and knowledge about them that is buttressed by large bodies of data. In the account 
presented here we have tried to limit what we claim only to those findings which are empirically 
well established. 
 
1.1 Structure and nomological network of intelligence 
People differ with respect to the efficiency with which their brains operate, and this is the domain 
of psychologists interested in intelligence differences. Given that intelligence differences are to 
be an important part of this piece, it is important to understand how they are structured and how 
they affect other aspects of people’s lives. For those wishing a more extended but accessible to 
guide to intelligence we recommend a short introduction to this topic by Deary (2001) and the 
consensus document provided by Neisser et al. (1996). 
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1.1.1 The structure of intelligence differences. The key question here is how many types of 
intelligence one needs to consider in studying people’s differences in intelligence, and their 
contribution to health differences. In the past, psychologists differed with respect to whether just 
one ‘general intelligence’ existed—people were just generally smart or not so smart—or whether 
there were many different types of intelligences, and that some people were good at some types 
of mental task and some people were good at others. Everyday experience offers some support 
for both options. By observation, there are people who seem mentally to excel at many things. On 
the other hand, some people seem to have obvious cognitive strengths, with some of their 
abilities seeming stronger than others. Consider, for example, the mental task of trying to 
multiply two numbers using mental arithmetic. Why are some people better than others at this 
type of task? Is it because some people are more intelligent than others, and that this applies to all 
mental work? Is it because that some people are better than others at all types of numerical 
ability, but not necessarily better at, say, verbal reasoning or spatial ability? Is it because some 
people are better than others at the specific task of multiplication, but not necessarily better at 
other number tasks or mental work more generally? The answer is that all three are correct to 
some extent, which we now explain. 
 
When a diverse range of mental tests is performed by a large group of people, the associations 
among the test scores form a very well-replicated pattern. The correlations among the test scores 
are universally positive. That is, no matter what type of mental work the tests involve, the general 
rule is that people who do well on one type of mental task tend to do well on all of the others. 
This is the phenomenon known as general intelligence—or general mental ability, or general 
cognitive ability—and it is usually shortened to just a lowercase italicized g: g. It was discovered 
by Charles Spearman in 1904, has been replicated in every database—several hundreds of them 
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(Carroll, 1993)—since then, and accounts for about half of the differences among people in their 
mental capability. There is also a clear finding that some types of test tend to have higher 
correlations among themselves than they do with others. For example, verbal test scores generally 
correlate more highly among themselves than they do with spatial ability tests or mental speed 
tests, each of which also generally have higher associations within its own type of test than with 
different types of test. This is the phenomenon that has led to the idea of multiple intelligences. 
This was first suggested—as a challenge to Spearman’s idea of general intelligence—by 
Thurstone (1938), and more recently in the popular Multiple Intelligences theory of Howard 
Gardner (1983). The problem with these theories is that they never accorded with data from real 
people: the supposedly separate intelligences typically had positive correlations among 
themselves and people who did well on them also tended to do well on the others, thus re-stating 
Spearman’s g (Johnson & Bouchard, 2005; Visser, Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). The fact is that 
there are separable domains of cognitive ability—such as reasoning, spatial ability, memory, 
processing speed, and vocabulary—but they are highly correlated (Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 
2010). People who do well in one area also tend to do well in the others, a phenomenon which is 
explained by g. However, apart from g some of the differences in people’s mental capabilities can 
be accounted for by differences in these domains; but not very much. Indeed, apart from g, the 
main types of mental capabilities in which people differ are those which are specific to each 
mental task. This results in what is known as the hierarchical model of intelligence differences. 
This model fits every data set that has been gathered pretty well and explains that people differ in 
three types of capability: general intelligence, broad domains of mental capability, and specific 
mental abilities (which includes error and occasion-specific variance), with the first and last 
explaining most of the differences. The three-level hierarchy was suggested in the first half of the 
20th century, but was consolidated mostly clearly by Carroll (1993), and has been replicated—
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with some revisions to the domain-level intelligences—in large data sets since then (Johnson & 
Bouchard, 2005). Importantly, it has also been shown clearly that the g factor that results from 
different test batteries ranks people in almost identical ways (Johnson, te Nijenhuis, & Bouchard, 
2008). 
 
1.1.2 Intelligence’s nomological network. The three-level hierarchical model of intelligence 
differences has been useful both for finding out how intelligence is associated with important 
aspects of people’s lives, and the causes of differences in intelligence. Indeed, for most of these 
types of study, the prime source of interest has been g. As will be seen below, with respect to its 
effects on health, it is g that seems to be the important factor, and not the more specific cognitive 
abilities. And, when individual tests are used in cognitive epidemiology, they appear to be 
associated with health as a result of their tapping g. Some tests seem to be especially good at 
calling on general intelligence for their performance; this includes nonverbal reasoning tests like 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices, and broad IQ-type tests like the Moray House Test series and the 
Alice Heim test series (see Deary & Batty, 2007). Ideally, in health research, one would hope to 
see people being given a diverse battery of mental tests from which a g factor score would be 
calculated for each person from, for example, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III 
(Wechsler, 1997), the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1993), or the Stanford Binet Intelligence Scale1 (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986). Sometimes 
this is done but, just as frequently people have been given a single test which has a substantial g 
loading. 
 
                                                 
1 An early version of the Stanford-Binet Scale was used to validate the Moray House Test which was used in the 
national intelligence surveys that formed the basis for some Scottish-based cognitive epidemiology studies (Deary, 
Whalley, & Starr, 2009, chapter 1). 
 9 
Intelligence differences—the rank order of individuals—do not come and go. In healthy 
individuals they show considerable stability of individual differences across the life course. For 
example, from age 11 years to almost age 80 years, the correlation is such that around half of the 
variance is stable (Deary, Whalley, Lemmon, Crawford, & Starr, 2000). Stability across shorter 
periods of time is, of course, even higher. Intelligence differences have a major impact in 
people’s lives. Health is a newcomer to what is called the predictive validity of intelligence. 
However, it has been known for many years that intelligence—especially general intelligence—
strongly predicts people’s success at work, in education, and in their social lives; and in everyday 
practical decision making (Gottfredson, 1997). A large meta-analysis showed that scores on a 
general intelligence test were the best predictors of hiring success and in job performance 
(Schmidt and Hunter, 1998). In datasets with tens of thousands of people, g scores at age 11 very 
strongly predict success in national school exams five years later (Deary, Strand, Smith, & 
Fernandes, 2007). Intelligence in childhood and early adulthood is also an important predictor of 
success in obtaining social mobility, adult social status, and income (Strenze, 2007). 
 
In addition to the impressive predictive validity of intelligence differences for life chances, it is 
also important to understand the origins of intelligence and quite a bit is known (Deary, Penke, & 
Johnson, 2010). Genetic factors account for a substantial proportion of the individual differences 
in intelligence (Deary, Johnson, & Houlihan, 2009). This applies to individuals within groups, 
and not to the origins of any between-group differences (Neisser et al., 1996). The principal 
genetic contribution is to differences in the g factor. The proportion of intelligence differences 
explained by genetic differences rises from low levels (20% to 30%) in early childhood, to levels 
as high as 70% to 80% in young and middle adulthood, with possibly some slight decline in old 
age. There is some evidence that genetic influences on intelligence, at least in childhood, are 
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stronger in more affluent by comparison with more deprived socioeconomic groups (e.g. 
Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron, D’Onofrio, & Gottesman, 2003). As yet, no variants of individual 
genes have been discovered that underlie this high heritability, apart from a small contribution 
from genetic variation in the gene for apolipoprotein E (APOE) which explains about 1% of the 
variation in some mental ability in old age (Wisdom, Callahan, & Hawkins, in press), and 
possibly even smaller contributions from COMT and BDNF genes (Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 
2010). There is a well-established modest correlation between intelligence and brain size—based 
on structural brain imaging in healthy people—but its cause is not known (McDaniel, 2005). 
Various types of functional brain scanning studies strongly suggest that more intelligent brains 
are also more efficient in how they process information (Neubauer & Fink, 2009). 
 
General intelligence declines with age, and there are probably some additional age-related 
declines in the cognitive domains of memory and processing speed (Salthouse, 2004; Hedden & 
Gabrieli, 2004; Schaie, 2005). However, aging raises an important distinction between two types 
of intelligence: fluid and crystallized (Horn, 1989). The types of cognitive ability that show a 
mean age-related decline are usually called aspects of fluid intelligence. They are assessed using 
tests that require active engagement with information, especially that which is novel and abstract, 
and completed under time pressure. Fluid intelligence involves working things out mentally on 
the spot. On the other hand, crystallized intelligence shows little age-related decline, and some 
tests of these capabilities even survive in the early stages of dementia (McGurn et al., 2004). 
Crystallized intelligence tests typically assess things like vocabulary and general knowledge, 
which involve the retrieval of well-established knowledge. Indeed, this type of knowledge is so 
stable that some tests are used in old age as highly accurate estimates of peak prior intelligence: a 
way at getting back to a person’s high-water mark of intelligence before the aging process 
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started. These tests include the National Adult Reading Test (in the UK), and the Wechsler Test 
of Adult Reading (more widely). The decline in intelligence with age brings with it decreased 
everyday capability and independence (Kirkwood, Bond, May, McKeith, & Teh, 2008) and—
especially in the context of aging societies—has meant that there is an economic mandate to find 
out why some people decline in intelligence more than others (Hendrie et al., 2006). Causes have 
been found in genetic variation (e.g. APOE), illness, biomarkers, physical fitness, brain structure 
and function, and demographic and social factors, including socioeconomic adversity (Deary et 
al., 2009). This means, of course, that there are additional causes of intelligence differences in old 
age when compared with youth.  
 
The topic of intelligence differences is perennially controversial. We submit the above brief 
summary as mainstream opinion within the differential psychology research community, 
including the reservations posed by Gardner (1983) and Turkheimer et al. (2003). However, it 
should be stated that there are additional influential contrary views, and some findings that 
challenge aspects of the account. For example, the Flynn (1987; Dickens & Flynn, 2001) effect—
whereby it is well attested that scores on standard intelligence tests rose throughout a substantial 
proportion of the 20th century, with those born in the later cohorts scoring better—suggests that 
IQ-type test scores are not immutable to environmental influences. And Nisbett (2009) has 
queried aspects of the twin and family designs used to derive heritability estimates and 
emphasized the possibility that cultural differences might generate differences in intelligence. 
However, these data and ideas should be understood with respect to their implications. For 
example, the Flynn effect, as recognized by the author himself, does cast doubt on the reliability 
and validity of intelligence differences found within a cohort. And when, for example, Nisbett 
suggests that parenting practices might be the origin of ‘environmentally’-caused intelligence 
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differences, it behooves him to examine whether such practices could be caused, at least in part, 
by differences in parental genotype (Hunt, 2009). It is our opinion that the summary of major 
facts about intelligence given above does not alter as a result of these writers contributions. 
Again, because the topic of intelligence can be controversial, it is important to have access to 
unbiased accounts. Once more, we recommend the American Psychological Association’s 
consensus overview for an even-handed summary of many important topics in intelligence 
differences (Neisser et al., 1996). 
 
Of special importance for this piece is the fact that there is sometimes reverse causation between 
intelligence and its purported causes. That is, when a correlation is found between some risk 
factor and intelligence in old age, the usual assumption is that the researcher has discovered a 
contribution to cognitive aging. However, with the right database, we can check the reverse, i.e., 
that long-standing differences in intelligence might, instead, have given rise to differences in the 
risk factor. That is not cognitive aging, it is cognitive epidemiology. We shall see an example of 
this with intelligence and C-reactive protein in old age (Luciano, Marioni, Gow, Starr, & Deary, 
2009). A third possibility is that there is some prior factor or set of factors that has caused 
differences in both the risk factor and intelligence, and that any correlation between them is 
spurious, and just a reflection of the fact that they both have an association with something more 
fundamental. Epidemiologists refer to this as confounding, and it is a perennial problem: it is 
discussed further in section 5.3.  
 
1.2 Structure and nomological network of personality traits 
In addition to intelligence, or cognitive abilities, people differ with respect to personality, which 
encompasses several stable traits related to behavior, affect, interpersonal interactions, and 
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cognitive dispositions. When you are asked, “what’s he like?” something physical might be 
intended. But, more often, the request is for a psychological description. Is the person typically 
generous or mean, irritable or placid, shy or outgoing? These descriptions and guesses about 
people’s general reactions and feelings are the phenomena that inspire personality trait theories. 
There are no given categories for classifying people into psychological types, and there is no a 
priori basis on which to allocate a given number of major traits. The major dimensions of 
personality along which people differ have emerged clearly only in the last few decades, after 
much large-scale psychometric research. For those wishing a more extended but accessible guide 
to personality traits, we recommend the short book by Nettle (2001). A more advanced account of 
personality trait research is provided by Matthews, Deary, and Whiteman (2009). 
 
1.2.1 The five personality factors and their measurement instruments. By about 1990, 
psychologists were converging on a consensus that there might be only five principal personality 
traits (Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2009). Personality psychologists often refer to these traits 
as the Big Five, or the Five-Factor Model. The arrival and broad acceptance of the Five-Factor 
Model of personality is a major scientific advance in the understanding of human psychology. 
For many decades of the 20th century, two prominent theorists in the personality trait world were 
Hans Eysenck and Raymond Cattell. Eysenck’s (1916-1997) theory was that there were three 
main personality traits, called neuroticism, extraversion, and psychoticism. To measure these, he 
devised and revised the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Cattell’s 
(1905-1998) theory was that there were 16 main personality traits, narrower in psychological 
content than Eysenck’s. He devised and revised a questionnaire called the 16PF (Cattell, Eber, & 
Tatsuoka, 1970). There were many more systems, each offering different numbers of personality 
traits with different names. For anyone wanting the true story of human personality it was not to 
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be had. However, apparently different trait theories had more in common than had been 
superficially obvious. For example, the overlaps in coverage of Cattell’s, Eysenck’s, and the 
Five-Factor Model’s traits are substantial (e.g., Aluja, Garcia, & Garcia, 2002). The history of, 
and convergence around, the currently-dominant Five-Factor Model of personality traits has been 
described by Digman (1990, 1996). 
 
A brief sketch of each of the five traits in the Five Factor Model is as follows. We shall rely on 
the most common names of each factor, though others have been used elsewhere. 
Neuroticism: a tendency to feel anxiety and other negative emotions versus a tendency to be 
calm and emotionally stable. 
Extraversion: a tendency to be outgoing and to take the lead in social situations versus a 
tendency to stay in the background socially and to be timid. 
Conscientiousness: a tendency to be organized and to follow rules versus a tendency to be 
somewhat careless, disorganized and not to plan ahead. 
Agreeableness: a tendency to be trusting and deferential versus a tendency to be distrustful 
and independent. 
Openness to Experience: a tendency to be open to new ideas and feelings and to like 
reflection versus shallowness and narrow in outlook. 
Such brief sketches do not cover the richness of personality traits. The Five-Factor Model’s 
personality traits are broader. They describe general tendencies in people’s behaviors, feelings, 
attitudes and thinking that are not well-suited for a single phrase or sentence. Table 1 is taken 
from the summary sheet from the most widely-used brief questionnaire for the Five-Factor 
Model: The NEO-Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It is used to indicate to the 
person being tested roughly what their score was and what it means in practical terms. Recall that 
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each of the traits has a normal distribution in the population, and a long range of scores from very 
high to very low, and that what is being described here is only each extreme and the middle. In 
the measurement scheme devised by Costa and McCrae (1992), in their full Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory, each of the five factors has six facets. Facets are psychologically narrower 
aspects of the broad traits (see Table 2). They are strongly correlated with each other within a 
trait. Much of the application of personality traits to health outcomes is done using the broad 
factors (sometimes called domains, dimensions, or traits, so do not be confused by variation in 
the terminology), but some is done using the facets. In each case, the way to think of personality 
traits is like measuring rulers. They are scales that measure aspects of human personality. Most 
people will have a middling score with fewer and fewer people as the scores become more 
extreme; just like height and weight, for example. 
 
Thus, there is a general consensus, though there are detractors (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Lee, 
Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005), that five broad dimensions or factors underlie and describe 
individual differences in non-cognitive traits (Digman, 1990). While there was early skepticism 
about the reality or validity of personality traits in a general sense (Mischel, 1968), there have 
since been many findings supporting their status as real and important psychological variables. In 
what follows we briefly recount some of the major issues that personality psychologists address 
with regard to the validity of personality traits. 
 
1.2.2 The nomological network of personality traits. There is ongoing research which addresses 
whether the five factors are too few. For example, some argue that honesty-humility is a sixth 
trait, important to humans and separate from the five factors (Ashton & Lee, 2005; Lee & 
Ashton, 2006). Others suggest that there are yet more traits that could be important. There is also 
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a parallel tendency to look for higher-order factors which supersede the Five-Factor Model. 
Noting some correlations among the five factors, Digman (1997) and later DeYoung (2006) 
emphasized two broad higher-order traits of stability and plasticity, which were thought to be 
important biological factors. Similarly, some have examined the correlations among the five 
personality traits and argued for a single, general personality factor (Musek, 2007). However, 
there is considerable evidence that the general personality factor is a methodological artifact (see, 
e.g., Bäckström, Björklund, & Larsson, 2009). Thus, it is our evaluation that the five personality 
factors should be considered separately with respect to health—not least because some appear to 
predict health outcomes whereas other do not—and that, unlike general intelligence, there is not 
such a compelling case to address general personality. For the most part, the suggested revisions 
to the Five-Factor Model are not large. The Five-Factor Model (or, at least, four of its factors, 
with openness as a partial exception) does account for variation in abnormal as well as normal 
personality variation (Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). 
 
Some or all of the five factors of personality are found in different language groups and cultures, 
making them universally applicable to health outcomes. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
has been translated into many different languages. In 26 cultures, many non-Western, McCrae 
(2001) found very similar personality structures for translations of the NEO-Personality 
Inventory. McCrae, Terracciano, and 78 other researchers (2005) asked 12,000 students in 50 
cultures to rate another person’s traits and found concordance with the American self-report 
structure. De Raad et al. (2009) examined 14 trait taxonomies in 12 languages and found 
especially strong replication for the five factor traits of extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness, though less so for emotional stability (the reverse of neuroticism) and 
intellect/imagination (similar to openness to experience). There is especially good agreement 
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across some languages. For example, English and German have very similar five factor structures 
in their lexicons (Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999). 
 
Health outcomes research is predicated on personality trait ratings being relatively stable aspects 
of the person and not transient states, such as mood (e.g., anxiety and depression). Stability has 
two aspects: the stability of mean levels, and the stability of individual differences. The five 
factors are mostly stable throughout adulthood, showing only slight mean declines in 
neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience, and slight increases in agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa, 2003; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Roberts, Walton, & 
Viechtbauer, 2006). A review of over 152 longitudinal studies with over 3000 correlation 
coefficients found that trait stability of individual differences increased from childhood to 
adulthood, rising from about 0.3 to over 0.7 (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). This supported 
earlier research with traits from the Five-Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1994) and Eysenck’s 
factors (Sanderman & Ranchor, 1994), which had found stability coefficients of well above 0.6, 
rising to above 0.8, for periods of between 6 and 30 years. The stability of individual differences 
among children can be high, given an appropriate measurement instrument (Measelle et al., 
2005). 
 
Most studies—including health studies—use self-ratings of traits. Therefore, it is important to 
establish that these ratings are indicators of objective differences, not some accident of self-
misperception. This is done using consensual validation studies, in which self-ratings are 
compared with ratings made by people who know the subject well. McCrae et al. (2004) 
reviewed 19 studies of cross-observer agreement in different cultures. They concluded that 
people, “include trait information in their self-reports and observer ratings”. Self- versus spouse-
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ratings were the highest of those reported with median consensual validity coefficients of .44, 
.57, .51, .50, and .42 for neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness, respectively. Personality traits are also related to outcomes such as behavior 
(Funder & Sneed, 1993), values (De Raad & Van Oudenhoven, 2008), music preferences 
(Rentfrow & Gosling, 2003, 2006), the characteristics of one’s work or living environments 
(Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002), subjective well-being (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; 
Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008), and mood as well as its disorders (Ivkovic et al., 2006; Stewart, 
Ebmeier, & Deary, 2005). 
 
Understanding of personality associations is better informed when the origins of personality 
variation are known. There is good evidence for the biological bases of personality dimensions. 
Personality traits, including the five factors, are substantially heritable (Bouchard & Loehlin, 
2001). Additive genetic factors account for about one third to a half of the personality trait 
variation among adults. This is true for all of the five factors. There are some differences between 
studies and some studies indicate some substantial non-additive genetic variance. Of course, even 
greater understanding would be possible if the contributions of individual genes to personality 
variation were known. However, molecular genetic studies still have found no solid associations 
between genetic variations and personality traits (Ebstein, 2006). Finally, as stated previously, the 
five dimensions of personality appear to be a human universal, being present in at least 50 
Western and non-Western cultures (McCrae et al., 2005). There is even evidence that other 
species have analogues of some of these dimensions (Gosling, 2001) and that chimpanzees, our 
closest living nonhuman relative, have six dimensions, including the five found in humans (King 
& Figueredo, 1997). 
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Besides intelligence and personality traits, few psychological constructs could muster such rich 
information on psychometric structure and nomological networks. Findings in the field of 
cognitive and personological epidemiology, therefore, can be addressed with the knowledge of 
these background strengths. 
 
2. Intelligence and health 
Whereas there are early reports of a link between early life intelligence and total mortality 
(mortality from all causes of death)—some nearly eight decades old (Maller, 1933)—research 
attention was not maintained and, instead, the focus shifted to the role of cognition in the etiology 
of mental health. This may simply have reflected the prevailing understanding that cognitive 
function, perhaps as a measure of sub-optimal neurodevelopment, would be more likely to 
influence psychological rather than physical well-being. It is also the case that the incidence of 
several of these mental health outcomes (e.g., depression, psychosis) peak, or at least first 
emerge, in early adulthood, many years before major physical disease such as cancer and 
cardiovascular disease become common enough to facilitate study. Accordingly, investigators 
working on longitudinal (cohort) studies could most robustly assess the links between 
intelligence and mental illness simply owing to the number of events. This section will first 
consider the role of intelligence in the etiology of mental outcomes, including the related 
outcomes of intentional injury (particularly completed and attempted suicide). We shall then 
review links with total mortality and some of its major constituent elements (cardiovascular 
disease, cancer).  
 
2.1 Mental Health 
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Understanding the determinants of mental health problems is important because such problems 
are likely to recur across the life course and lead to reduced life expectancy, perhaps because 
people affected by mental illness have poorer health behaviors. Whereas it is perhaps to be 
expected that the presence of mental illness, such as depression, elevates the risk of suicide 
(Miles, 1977), there is also a suggestion that sufferers experience higher rates of cardiovascular 
disease (Phillips et al., 2009). There is evidence from both the 1958 and 1970 British Birth 
Cohort studies (Gale, Hatch, Batty, & Deary, 2009) that the prevalence of self-reported 
psychological distress—formerly referred to as common mental disorder—in early adulthood is 
lower in study members who had higher intelligence test results in childhood relative to their 
lower performing counterparts. However, requesting an individual who is experiencing 
significant bouts of anxiety or depression accurately to rate their mood raises concerns over 
validity. One solution is to utilize a more objective measure of mental health such as data on 
hospital admissions/discharge or interviews with a trained mental health professional.   
 
Well-characterized cohort studies typically reveal an association between low intelligence test 
scores and the risk of hospital admission for any psychological disorder by middle age. There is 
some support that this may point to a general susceptibility in studies which have the capacity to 
examine the association between measured intelligence and a range of specific, important mental 
health problems. In one of the most sizeable studies, conducted in a cohort of one million 
Scandinavian men, mental health outcomes were based on conditions serious enough to warrant 
in-patient care (Gale, Batty, Tynelius, Deary, & Rasmussen, 2010).  Lower intelligence at about 
age 20 years was associated with a greater risk of eight psychiatric disorders by midlife (Gale et 
al., 2010): for a one SD disadvantage in intelligence—assessed using a general score derived 
from four diverse mental tests—there was a 60% greater risk in the hazard of being admitted for 
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schizophrenia, a 50% greater risk for mood disorders, and a 75% greater risk of alcohol-related 
disorders. In the Vietnam Experience Study (VES) cohort, very unusually, study members had an 
interview with a psychologist in middle age from which it was possible to ascertain both serious 
conditions, but also mental health problems of a more moderate nature (Gale et al., 2008).  
Intelligence at enlistment at a mean age of about 22 years—based on a combination of verbal and 
numerical tests—was inversely related to the risk of alcohol disorders, depression, generalized 
anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Gale et al., 2008). Moreover, there was 
evidence that those with comorbid psychiatric problems had especially low intelligence. 
Elsewhere, and again using Swedish data, in a cohort of school children followed for over three 
decades, there was a suggestion that low cognitive ability was related to a raised risk of 
personality disorder, an effect that was seen across the full range of intelligence (Moran, 
Klinteberg, Batty, & Vagero, 2009). This graded association is a common observation in studies 
exploring links between intelligence and mental health, and suggests that the raised risk of 
disease is not merely confined to men and women with below average intelligence test scores. 
Notably, the associations described above typically hold after adjusting for a range of markers of 
socioeconomic status which included parental occupational social class and income. 
 
2.1.1 Intentional injury. Mental illness is frequently implicated as a cause of intentional injury 
(Miles, 1977). With the relationships described above between intelligence and a range of mental 
health problems, there is therefore a degree of circumstantial evidence that intelligence may have 
a role in intentional injury, chiefly suicide and homicide. Intentional injury or death can be self-
inflicted, for example attempted or completed suicide, or it can be the result of others’ actions, 
including physical attack and homicide. There are inherent problems in exploring the causes of 
these outcomes. For suicide, for instance, attempted and completed (death) are thought to have 
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different etiologies; that is, the circumstances and mental processes that lead an individual to self-
harm versus the taking of their own life may be very different. For example, completed suicide is 
more common in men, whereas non-fatal suicidal-type behaviors are more common in women 
and in younger individuals (Nock et al., 2008). Additionally, as a result of the low numbers of 
suicide and homicide cases in most cohorts relative, for instance, to chronic disease (e.g., cancer) 
and unintentional injury (e.g., road traffic accidents), very few studies are sufficiently well 
powered to evaluate their associations with premorbid intelligence.  
 
A cross-sectional ecological study of census data from almost one hundred European and Asian 
countries reported a positive association between the estimated mean standardized intelligence 
score (an IQ-type estimate) of each country and incidence of suicide among older adults 
(Voracek, 2004). Whereas such studies are regarded in epidemiology as being of some value 
because they lead to hypothesis generation, they offer very little insight into disease processes.  
There are also several examples in chronic disease epidemiology of the ecological fallacy; that is, 
results from such group-based studies do not replicate findings seen at the level of the individual. 
Published in the same year, investigators using the Swedish Conscripts Study reported a robust 
reverse gradient; that is, lower premorbid intelligence test scores were associated with an 
increased risk of death by suicide up to midlife (Gunnell, Magnusson, & Rasmussen, 2005) (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Within the same Swedish cohort, Batty and his colleagues related the Swedish conscripts’ 
intelligence test scores to homicide mortality after twenty years of follow-up. A one SD 
advantage in premorbid intelligence was associated with a 51% reduced risk of death by 
homicide, and the effect was incremental across the intelligence range (Batty, Mortensen, Gale, 
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& Deary, 2008; Batty, Deary, Tengstrom, & Rasmussen, 2008). This association was only 
marginally attenuated by controlling for a range of covariates. This finding prompted the same 
group of investigators to explore the link between intelligence and hospitalization for assault via 
various means (Whitley et al., 2010a). These results supported those for homicide: men with 
higher intelligence were less likely to experience an assault of any description, and a similar 
pattern of association was apparent for stabbings, attack using a blunt instrument, or injury 
caused by a fight/brawl (see Figure 2). Figure 2 shows that, in the age-adjusted model, the hazard 
of being involved a fight/brawl is over eight times as great for the lowest versus the highest IQ 
group. The raw numbers given by Whitley et al. (2010a, Table 3) show that, given that this is just 
one cause of injury/illness, the effect is not trivial. Combining the three highest IQ groups, only 
0.5% had had a hospital admission over an average of 24 years of follow-up. Combining the 
lowest two IQ groups, the figure was 2.5%. In both the homicide and the assault reports these 
authors have considered a number of possible explanations for the associations, including: 
neighborhood effects, risk perception differences, differences in verbal skills for conflict 
resolution, perpetrator-victim correlation of traits such as intelligence, and alcohol intoxication. 
 
Figure 2 also illustrates a persistent issue in the field of cognitive epidemiology and 
epidemiology in general: possible confounding by various indicators that are often used to 
indicate socioeconomic position, in this case educational attainment. As a research group, where 
the data are available, we have always presented intelligence-medical outcome associations with 
and without adjustment for education and other available factors. Typically, adding education to a 
multivariable model leads to very marked attenuation (see Figure 2) and, in some cases, 
nullification, of the intelligence-health outcome gradient. However, this may simply be a 
reflection of multicollinearity, because education and intelligence are strongly correlated. Indeed, 
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the more detailed the educational outcome variable, the stronger the relation with intelligence, 
such that the coefficient of association nears 1.0 (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007). This 
being the case, controlling for education in this scenario raises concerns of over-adjustment: 
educational outcomes could be acting to some extent as proxies for cognitive ability. We also 
recognize that there is evidence that education might increase scores in intelligence-type tests 
(Ceci, 1991), and we have contributed an examination of the education-intelligence association as 
it applies in epidemiology for those who wish to consider this important topic at greater length 
(Deary & Johnson, in press). 
 
2.1.2 Dementia. The studies described above typically assess mental health no later than middle 
age. They therefore do not have the capacity to explore the link between cognition and cognitive 
decline such as dementia and its sub-types (e.g., Alzheimer’s Disease) which typically occur in 
older age. With a demographic shift towards a rapidly aging population, allied to the absence of 
successful treatments, understanding the causes of dementia is crucial in efforts to prevent the 
disorder. One of the few studies that have several decades of follow-up between intelligence 
assessment and ascertainment of dementia was a sample from the Scottish Mental Survey that 
took place in 1932. This Survey tested the intelligence of almost all children born in 1921 and 
attending school in Scotland on one day in June 1932 (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009). The 
intelligence test used was one of the Moray House series of tests. These are group-administered 
mental tests with a range of items, but especially verbal reasoning. Test scores correlate very 
highly (~.8) with the individually administered Binet scales (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009). The 
study found an association between low childhood intelligence and the risk of late-onset, but not 
early-onset, dementia (Whalley et al., 2000). A larger follow-up sample of the Scottish Mental 
Survey of 1932 enabled late-onset dementia cases to be separated into vascular dementia and 
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Alzheimer’s type dementia. The investigators reported that lower childhood intelligence was a 
risk factor for late-onset vascular dementia, but not Alzheimer’s-type dementia, suggesting that 
vascular processes rather than cognitive reserve are likely mediators in the pathway between 
early life intelligence and later cognitive decline (McGurn, Deary, & Starr, 2008). This is 
consistent with an inverse association between intelligence and later cardiovascular disease, in 
particular coronary heart disease and, most relevantly, cerebrovasular accident (stroke), both of 
which have vascular origins (see later discussion).   
 
2.1.3 Unintentional injury. A small cluster of studies have examined links between intelligence 
and unintentional injuries, drawing on data from the Aberdeen children of the 1950s study (Batty 
et al., 2004), the Danish Metropolit study (Osler et al., 2004), and the Swedish conscripts study 
(Batty et al., 2007e). Whereas the two former studies found graded associations—unintentional 
injuries were more common in people with lower prior intelligence—they were somewhat 
underpowered to examine links with specific injury outcomes. Again, the Swedish conscripts 
study, because it is up to three orders of magnitude larger in scale, has the power to explore these 
links. What is immediately evident is that the effects estimates seen in these analyses are 
markedly larger than those apparent for somatic disease and mental health outcomes. In the 
Swedish studies, on comparing the lower end of the intelligence spectrum with the higher end, 
there is typically a doubling of risk. However, when different types of unintentional injury are the 
outcome of interest, up to a six-fold elevated risk is seen. We have also examined links between 
intelligence and hospital admissions for unintentional injury in this cohort (Whitley et al., 2010b), 
and results accord with those described for mortality.  
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2.1.4 Possible mechanisms. The intelligence-health gradients described above do not appear to 
have artifactual explanations: confounding, sample bias, reverse causality, chance. This has led to 
speculation about the underlying causal mechanisms. There are likely to be a series of shared or 
overlapping processes linking intelligence with the above-described mental health outcomes. 
When psychological illness is the outcome of interest, one possibility is that intelligence might 
capture sub-optimal neurodevelopment or, perhaps, the early subclinical stages of mental illness 
itself (Batty, Mortensen, & Osler, 2005). It is possible that the link is related to sociodemographic 
variables, such that stress and thereafter mental illness arise from being less adept at school and 
work. There are some strong advocates of such an explanation (Marmot, 2004; Sapolsky, 2005) 
though evidential links in the causal chain are missing (Deary, Batty, & Gottfredson, 2005). As 
indicated, the link between low intelligence and increased suicide risk may be mediated via 
mental illness, such as depression and psychosis. An alternative explanation is that having 
reduced cognitive function limits an individual’s capacity to resolve problems or personal crises, 
such that suicide/self-harm occurs more prominently as a solution (Gunnell et al., 2005). For 
unintentional injury, low cognitive ability may signal either a sub-optimal perception of risk 
(Batty, Deary, Schoon, & Gale, 2007b) and/or longer reaction times as intelligence and reaction 
time are inversely related (Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001). Both of these processes may elevate the 
risk of occupational and domestic injury such as the operation of machinery, and negotiating a 
hazardous environment more generally.   
 
2.2 Somatic Health 
2.2.1 Total mortality. A systematic review identified nine independent longitudinal cohort 
studies, each of which found an association between lower premorbid intelligence test scores and 
greater risk of all-cause mortality in adulthood (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007a). There was 
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a suggestion that the intelligence-mortality association was stepwise and there was, at best, a very 
modest influence of confounding by early life socioeconomic circumstances. Subsequently, there 
has been an increase in the publication frequency of intelligence versus all-cause (total) mortality 
studies and we are currently in the process of updating this review within the context of a meta-
analysis. As an outcome, total mortality comprises a range of causes of death, both external and 
internal, not all of which are, a priori, likely to demonstrate associations with intelligence. It is 
therefore more informative—especially with an eye to making the research relevant to public 
health—to explore disease-specific effects. In brief, we do so now for cardiovascular disease and 
site-specific cancers. 
 
2.2.2 Cardiovascular disease. In middle- to older-age Western populations, the most common 
cause of death and disability is cardiovascular disease. Accordingly, this disorder has most 
frequently been examined in relation to intelligence. Cardiovascular disease can be broadly 
subdivided into coronary heart disease and stroke. Coronary heart disease is the leading cause of 
death in the United States and occurs when the coronary arteries which supply blood to the heart 
are blocked by fatty deposits (atherosclerosis). When this occurs, heart muscles die and an 
individual is said to have a heart attack. This subdividing is necessary because the epidemiology 
of these conditions differs. For instance, raised blood cholesterol is risk factor for coronary heart 
disease but not stroke. The first examination of the intelligence-coronary heart disease link was 
conducted in Scotland. In this study, 938 participants from the Midspan prospective cohort 
studies, initiated in the 1970s, were, based on their birth date, linked to their intelligence test 
scores at age 11, as captured using the Scottish Mental Survey 1932 (Hart et al., 2004). After 
approximately three decades of mortality and morbidity surveillance, a 1 SD disadvantage in 
intelligence at age 11 was related to 11% increased risk of hospital admission or death due to 
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cardiovascular disease. This observation has been replicated in other cohorts drawn from 
Scotland (Deary, Whiteman, Starr, Whalley, & Fox, 2004), and Sweden (Hemmingsson, Melin, 
Allebeck, & Lundberg, 2006).  
 
In studies of cardiovascular disease sub-types, the Midspan study (Hart et al., 2004) found a 16% 
increased risk of coronary heart disease (hospital admission or death) per SD disadvantage in 
childhood intelligence. Again, these results accord with those from cohorts drawn from Denmark 
(Batty, Mortensen, Nybo Andersen, & Osler, 2005), Sweden (Batty et al., 2009), and the United 
States (Batty, Shipley, Mortensen, Gale, & Deary, 2008b)—all of which sampled men—and in a 
rare mixed-gender sample from Scotland where there was no strong evidence of a differential 
effect by gender (Lawlor, Batty, Clark, MacIntyre, & Leon, 2008). Adjusting for childhood and 
early adult covariates had little impact on these gradients. 
 
Studies of the association between premorbid intelligence and stroke have revealed less clear 
findings. This may result from the low numbers of stroke events in many studies, so leading to 
sub-optimal statistical power. However, in a sufficiently large study—the Aberdeen Children of 
the 1950s cohort—a one SD advantage in intelligence at age 11 years was associated with a 32% 
reduced risk of incident stroke by middle age (Lawlor et al., 2008). The effect that was stronger 
in women than men. Furthermore, the Swedish Conscripts cohort was large enough to estimate 
the effects of premorbid intelligence on risk of stroke subtype: ischemic and hemorrhagic 
(Modig, Silventoinen, Tynelius, Bergman, & Rasmussen, 2009). Again, these associations were 
robust to the adjustment of collateral data.    
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2.2.3 Cancer. Cancers share some common modifiable risk factors with cardiovascular disease, 
including obesity and tobacco smoking. This has led to speculation that premorbid intelligence 
and selected cancers are also related. Despite some reasonably well-designed studies, the 
evidence to date suggests that the association is weak. For instance, data from two studies 
essentially found no relation between intelligence and cancer from all sites combined (Batty et 
al., 2007e; Hemmingsson et al., 2006). However, as a total cancer endpoint comprises dozens of 
different cancer sub-types, many of which have no unifying etiology, exploring the relationship, 
if any, between intelligence and the more common malignancies such as lung cancer would be 
more informative.   
 
Perhaps owing to the relationship between intelligence and later smoking habits—initiation and 
cessation—an elevated risk of lung cancer has been reported in adult Scottish men and women 
who had lower intelligence test scores in childhood (Batty, Deary, & MacIntyre, 2007b; Taylor et 
al., 2003). Similar results have been reported for stomach cancer which, like carcinoma of the 
lung, is strongly related to cigarette smoking (Hart et al., 2003). Again, analyzing the much larger 
Swedish conscripts study, Batty and colleagues (Batty et al., 2007e) found little evidence of an 
association between intelligence and 19 different malignancies. The only exception was skin 
cancer which was positively related to intelligence. This may be ascribed to the much replicated 
relation between higher intelligence and job income (Neisser et al., 1996), and the resulting 
increased frequency of holidays taken in sunny climates, although the association was only 
slightly attenuated after controlling for socioeconomic status. 
  
2.2.4 Possible mechanisms. The mechanisms that might explain the relations between 
intelligence and cardiovascular disease—we focus on this outcome owing to the dearth of 
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convincing evidence, to date, to link intelligence and cancer—are likely to differ from those 
mechanisms advanced above for the link between intelligence, mental illness, and injury. In a 
figure that also depicts some of the early life determinants of pre-adult cognition, these possible 
mechanistic pathways have been set out previously (see Figure 3). Having alluded to several of 
the mechanisms elsewhere in this piece, here we focus on disease prevention, adult 
socioeconomic position, and so-called system integrity.  
 
Tobacco smoking (Taylor et al., 2003; Batty et al., 2007b; Batty, Deary, Schoon, & Gale, 2007a), 
excessive alcohol consumption/alcohol abuse (Batty, Deary, & MacIntyre, 2006; Batty et al., 
2007c; Gale et al., 2008), physical inactivity (Batty, Deary, Schoon, & Gale, 2007c), and poor 
diet (Batty et al., 2007c)—all of which may elevate the risk of cardiovascular disease and 
selected cancers—appear to be more common in men and women who have lower scores on 
intelligence tests in childhood and early adulthood. Similarly, some of the physiological 
consequences of these behaviors, such as obesity (Chandola, Deary, Blane, & Batty, 2006) and 
raised blood pressure (Starr et al., 2004), are also related to lower childhood intelligence test 
scores. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the generally low correlation between behavior and 
physiology (a diet rich in cholesterol does not necessarily lead to high blood cholesterol), the 
magnitude of the relationship between intelligence and physiological characteristics appears to be 
lower than that seen for intelligence and health behaviors. Some of the afore mentioned  
components (obesity, blood pressure) comprise the metabolic syndrome, and there is also a 
suggestion that lower intelligence test scores are associated with an increased risk of this disorder 
(Batty et al., 2008a; Richards et al., 2010). In the study by Batty et al. (2008a), the influence of 
intelligence on the metabolic syndrome was independent of education, and adjusting for the 
 31 
metabolic syndrome removed about one third of the now reasonably well-established association 
between intelligence and cardiovascular disease mortality. 
 
Plausibly, then, these risk factors may partly mediate the relationship between intelligence and 
cardiovascular disease. To examine this issue requires a dataset with information on intelligence, 
later measurement of these risk factors, and then subsequent ascertainment of cardiovascular 
disease. Two such studies—the Vietnam Experience Study (Batty et al., 2008b) and the Midspan-
Scottish Mental Survey 1932 linkage (Hart et al., 2004)—have found that, whereas behavioral 
and physiological do not fully explain the relationship, controlling for later socioeconomic status 
appears to have a large impact. This potentially points to chains of events: high intelligence test 
scores lead to educational success, placement into a high social status profession and increased 
income. Higher adult social status confers protection against cardiovascular disease. However, it 
is possible that the often-impressive attenuation of the intelligence-health associations found after 
adjusting for education and/or socioeconomic status could occur because variation in these 
factors, to a large extent, reflect variation in earlier intelligence (Deary, Strand, Smith, & 
Fernandes, 2007; Strenze, 2007). Causally informative studies are required to pick apart such 
possibilities. 
 
Finally, the system integrity hypothesis (Whalley & Deary, 2001; Deary, 2008) posits that 
individual differences in the integrity of an underlying general physiological make-up may 
explain the association between premorbid intelligence and health outcomes. This, often rather 
vaguely articulated, idea is that intelligence tests reflect not just brain efficiency; rather, they are 
detecting the brain aspect of a well-put-together body more generally; one that is well placed to 
respond to environmental challenges, and to be able to return to equilibrium after allostatic load. 
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Therefore, testing this hypothesis demands a search for other possible markers of system 
integrity; other measurable indicators of bodily and brain efficiency. Reaction time tasks, which 
measure information processing efficiency, have been significantly associated with all-cause-
mortality, in that faster reaction times are associated with reduced risk (Deary & Der, 2005). In 
this Scottish adult cohort of 898 study members, reaction time also very substantially attenuated 
the association between prior intelligence and all-cause mortality after 14 years of follow up. This 
finding lends support to the system integrity theory of intelligence’s associations with health 
outcomes, if processing speed is an effective indicator of neurological integrity which reflects 
overall physiological integrity. However, without full understanding of why intelligence and 
reaction time correlate significantly, the interpretation of mechanisms remains problematic. 
Moreover, the construct of system integrity remains to be explicated more fully. A further 
attempt to test the system integrity hypothesis used psychomotor coordination and intelligence 
test scores from childhood in the 1958 and 1970 British birth cohorts (Gale, Batty, Cooper, & 
Deary, 2009). The health outcomes were obesity, self-rated health and psychological distress 
assessed when people were in their early 30s. In accordance with the system integrity idea, both 
intelligence and psychomotor coordination were significantly correlated; and both were 
significantly associated with all of the health outcomes thirty-plus years later. However, the 
association between intelligence and the health outcomes was not attenuated after adjusting for 
psychomotor coordination; and the association between psychomotor coordination and the health 
outcomes was not attenuated after adjusting for intelligence. Childhood intelligence and 
psychomotor coordination were, thus, independently associated with health in the 30s. This did 
not support the idea that intelligence and psychomotor coordination were both markers of some 
more general body integrity that is relevant to long-term health. 
 
 33 
3. Personality and your health 
Interest in “epidemiological personology” (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000, p. 967) is not new. 
The Roman physician and philosopher Galen promoted the long held belief that health was a 
condition in which there was balance among four bodily fluids, called humors (blood, phlegm, 
yellow bile, and black bile) and that imbalance would adversely influence a patient’s health and 
personality. Long since Galen’s time, considerable research has shown that personality traits and 
health are interrelated. One can roughly divide this research into areas focusing on four types of 
health outcomes. The first examines the relationship between personality and physical health 
outcomes such as disease and death. The second examines the relationship between personality 
and precursors of disease such as inflammatory markers, dysregulation of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, and the metabolic syndrome. The third avenue of this research 
examines the relationships between personality dimensions and either behaviors or demographic 
risk factors which directly or indirectly impact health. The fourth, and largely unexplored, avenue 
of this research examines the possibility that personality traits are not causally related to disease 
but are, instead, biomarkers for risk. Because it is a massive area of research on its own and 
because they are better-known findings, owing to space constraints, we shall not include the 
associations between personality and mental disorders here. 
 
3.1 Personality and coronary heart disease: Type A and Hostility 
One large area in the study of personality and health outcomes has focused on coronary heart 
disease and mortality. Whereas it was not the earliest paper examining personality predictors of 
coronary heart disease (see, e.g., Storment, 1951), a seminal paper by Friedman and Rosenman 
(1959) noted that, compared to healthy matched controls, the behavior of men who had coronary 
heart disease was characterized by an “intense, sustained drive for achievement and as being 
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continually involved in competition and deadlines, both at work and in their avocations” (p. 
1286). This seminal study between coronary heart disease and what came to be known as the 
Type A personality spawned a wave of studies on the relationship between personality and 
coronary heart disease which lasted for decades. In a review of this literature, Booth-Kewley and 
Friedman (1987) revealed modest relationships between Type A personality and coronary heart 
disease. They also found that these relationships were stronger in cross-sectional studies than in 
prospective studies—suggesting the possibility of some reverse causality—and when a structured 
interview was used to assess Type A personality as opposed to self-reports. Finally, this same 
review found evidence that other personality traits were risk factors for coronary heart disease, 
namely those indicative of depression, angry hostility or aggression, and anxiety. A subsequent 
meta-analysis (Matthews, 1988) questioned Booth-Kewley and Friedman’s conclusions regarding 
Type A personality, arguing that it may, instead, be related to other risk factors for coronary heart 
disease in the general as opposed to the at-risk population (see H. S. Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 
1988 for a rebuttal). To try and better understand the apparent relationship between Type A 
personality and CHD, researchers sought to identify whether specific subcomponents of Type A 
personality were responsible for the relationship. The toxic subcomponents of the Type A 
personality—namely aspects of Type A personality significantly associated with coronary heart 
disease—were those which described antagonistic hostility as opposed to components such as 
speech style or verbal competition (Dembroski, MacDougall, Costa, & Grandits, 1989). In a 
study which sought to base antagonistic hostility in the context of the five personality factors, 
Dembroski and Costa (1987) showed that it was most strongly related to lower agreeableness, 
and it was also moderately related to higher neuroticism.  
 
3.2 Personality and CHD: Other personality risk factors 
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In addition to the findings with respect to Type A personality and antagonistic hostility as 
predictors of coronary heart disease, researchers have examined other traits identified by Booth-
Kewley and Friedman. A development in this area has been the identification of the distressed 
type or Type D personality (Denollet, 2005; Denollet, Sys, & Brutsaert, 1995; Kupper & 
Denollet, 2007). Individuals exhibiting a Type D personality are both high in negative affect 
(unhappy, irritated, and worrying) and social inhibition (shy, inhibited in social interactions, and 
closed).2 Cardiac patients who exhibit a Type D personality are at substantially greater risk for 
poorer outcomes, including death (Pedersen & Denollet, 2006). Finally, cardiac patients higher in 
four facets of openness to experience—including openness to aesthetics, feelings, actions, and 
ideas—were at reduced risk for cardiac mortality (Jonassaint et al., 2007). Openness has a modest 
positive correlation with intelligence, which could explain some of this finding. 
 
3.3 Personality and your life: The Terman Life-Cycle Study 
The other major area of research in epidemiological personology concerns whether certain 
personality dimensions are related to a longer or shorter lifespan. Initial studies focused on 
hostility and neuroticism as predictors of mortality from all causes (e.g., Almada et al., 1991). 
However, since that time, conscientiousness has been identified as the key personality trait 
predictor of longevity. This association was first uncovered in a follow-up study of over 1,178 
participants in Terman’s Life-Cycle Study (Friedman, Tucker, Tomlinsonkeasey, Schwartz, 
Wingard, & Criqui, 1993). The participants, sometimes referred to as the Termites, were a 
representative sample of bright school children whose Stanford-Binet IQs were at least 135 
(Terman, 1925). In 1922 when the children were approximately 12 years old, they were rated on 
                                                 
2 The description of this construct factor as a ‘type’ is a misnomer. Similar combinations using Neuroticism and 
Extraversion have been described as a gloomy pessimist style of well-being (Costa & Piedmont, 2003). 
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25 traits by one or both of their parents and their teachers. In addition to using these ratings to 
create scales related to neuroticism (“Permanency of Mood”), extraversion (“High Energy and 
Sociability”), and agreeableness (“Cheerfulness”), Friedman and his colleagues constructed a 
scale related to conscientiousness using ratings on “prudence,” “conscientiousness,” and 
“truthfulness”. Survival analysis revealed that students who had been higher in conscientiousness 
in childhood were more likely to be alive when mortality was assessed 64 years later. In addition 
to neuroticism, and contrary to expectations, cheerfulness was related to greater mortality risk 
(Friedman et al., 1993). 
 
3.4 Personality and your life: Beyond the Termites 
Whereas Friedman’s study could be criticized for the homogeneity of the sample on cognitive 
and social grounds, a review of studies on 20 independent samples (Kern & Friedman, 2008), 
many of which differed dramatically from the Termites, showed that conscientiousness was a 
clear predictor of mortality across samples and held even when controlling for traditional risk 
factors.  
 
Other studies of personality and longevity have examined either all, or subsets of, personality 
trait measures related to the Five-Factor Model. A review of this literature (Roberts, Kuncel, 
Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007) found that, overall, lower conscientiousness, lower 
extraversion/positive emotions, higher neuroticism, and lower agreeableness conferred greater 
mortality risk. Moreover, they noted that the magnitude of risk posed by these personality 
predictors was equal to (or greater than) that posed by low socioeconomic status and even lower 
intelligence. It is worth noting that, whereas the effects of conscientiousness were consistent 
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across studies, there was some variability in the direction of the effect for other personality 
factors (e.g., higher neuroticism was related to greater longevity in some studies). 
 
3.5 Personality and other health outcomes 
3.5.1 Other diseases. Compared to the research on personality and either coronary heart disease 
or longevity, there is considerably less research on personality predictors of other diseases. 
However, progress has been made on this front. In a study of the MIDUS national representative 
sample, Goodwin and Friedman (2006) found that, of the five personality dimensions, 
conscientiousness and neuroticism were consistently related to the presence of several self-
reported diseases. Of this sample, participants reporting diabetes, high blood pressure, hernia, or 
bone and joint problems were lower in conscientiousness but did not differ in neuroticism. 
Participants reporting ulcers, asthma or bronchitis, and other lung problems were higher in 
neuroticism but did not differ in conscientiousness; and participants reporting persistent skin 
problems, sciatica/lumbago, urinary/bladder problems, stroke, or tuberculosis were both lower in 
conscientiousness and higher in neuroticism. Similarly, Chapman, Lyness, and Duberstein (2007) 
found that the same pattern of results held for the aggregate medical illness burden as assessed by 
patient records. 
 
Personality dimensions have also been identified as risk factors for physician-diagnosed 
conditions. Of note is a study which showed that, among a sample of nearly 1,000 older members 
of religious orders, those with high as opposed to low conscientiousness were at reduced risk for 
Alzheimer disease and mild cognitive impairment (Wilson, Schneider, Arnold, Bienias, & 
Bennett, 2007). 
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3.5.2 Disease Progression. Personality dimensions may also influence the course of diseases. 
One notable example is the case of cancer. A review of the literature suggested that, whereas 
traits related to negative affect and depression are not related to the development of cancer, they 
adversely influence the course of the disease and lead to a greater likelihood of mortality 
(Denollet, 1999). A second notable example is the case of HIV disease progression; higher 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness were related to slower disease progression as 
indicated by reductions in viral load and increases in CD4 counts over time (Ironson, O’Cleirigh, 
Weiss, Schneiderman, & Costa, 2008; O’Cleirigh, Ironson, Weiss, & Costa, 2007). 
 
3.5.3 Precursors: Inflammatory Markers. Alongside health outcomes such as mortality, disease 
incidence, and disease progression, researchers have explored the possibility that personality 
could impact precursors to diseases. A study by Sutin et al. (2009) found that high neuroticism 
and low conscientiousness were associated with higher levels of interleukin-6 and C-reactive 
protein, markers related to chronic inflammation, morbidity, and mortality. They also found that 
participants in the top and bottom 10% of neuroticism and conscientiousness, respectively, were 
at significantly increased risk of exceeding clinically-relevant levels of interleukin-6. 
 
3.5.4 Precursors: HPA-axis dysregulation. Similarly, studies have examined whether personality 
is a risk factor for HPA-axis dysregulation. The HPA-axis is activated in times of stress and 
readies the body for ‘fight or flight’ responses. However, if there is chronic activation of this 
system, it contributes to allostatic load or wear and tear on the body and organs (McEwen, 2000). 
At least three studies have shown a relationship between higher neuroticism and traits related to 
neuroticism and dysregulation of the HPA-axis as measured by cortisol responses to chemical 
challenges (Mangold & Wand, 2006; Tyrka et al., 2006; Tyrka et al., 2008). These findings 
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suggest that the HPA-axes of individuals higher in these traits are either more vulnerable to the 
stressors which they experience, experience more stressors, or simply have higher levels of 
activation throughout the day. 
 
3.5.5 Precursors: Metabolic syndrome. Finally, researchers have examined whether neuroticism 
is a risk factor for the metabolic syndrome and its components. The metabolic syndrome, as 
discussed previously, describes a confluence of conditions that are major risk factors for diabetes 
and cardiovascular disease. Phillips et al. (in press) found that neuroticism was a risk factor for 
metabolic syndrome and three of its components: obesity, high triglycerides, hypertension, and 
high blood glucose levels. Most of these associations were no longer significant after controlling 
for other risk factors and intelligence, though neuroticism remained a risk factor for obesity and 
hypertension.  
 
4. Mechanisms 
Given these many associations, by what means could personality influence health? Personality 
traits are related to many potentially important factors impacting health, including coping style, 
social support, and depression, and it would be beyond the scope of this article thoroughly to 
review the literature. Instead, we will focus on two predominant classes of possibilities: health 
behaviors and socioeconomic status.  
 
4.1 Health Behaviors 
One possibility is that personality traits are related to health-harming or health-promoting 
behaviors which directly effect health. This mechanism is highly plausible: a review of 194 
studies by Bogg and Roberts (2004) showed that high conscientiousness was consistently related 
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to more health promoting (e.g., exercise and healthy diet) and fewer health-harming behaviors 
(e.g., alcohol abuse and fast driving). In a study of the five personality dimensions and smoking, 
Terracciano and Costa (2004) showed that, in addition to low conscientiousness, high 
neuroticism and low agreeableness were related to smoking. Moreover, participants who had high 
neuroticism and low conscientiousness scores—i.e., those whose style of impulse control was 
classified as undercontrolled—were particularly at risk. Personality’s influence on health 
behaviors may also impact how well patients manage diseases. This was confirmed in a study of 
patients with end-stage renal disease, a chronic condition requiring kidney dialysis and a complex 
treatment regimen. Of the five dimensions, conscientiousness predicted better adherence to 
medication (Christensen & Smith, 1995), something that is also found with intelligence (Deary et 
al., 2009). 
 
4.2 Socioeconomic status 
Another important route by which personality may impact health is via socioeconomic status, 
which we earlier identified as a well-known predictor of health outcomes, and a possible 
mediator of the association between intelligence and health outcomes. Lower neuroticism and 
higher extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness are related to several 
indicators of higher socioeconomic status (Jonassaint, Siegler, Barefoot, Edwards, & Williams, in 
press). Whereas the relationship is likely to be reciprocal, it is not hard to envisage how this 
configuration of traits could lead to higher educational achievement, income, and social status, 
which, subsequently, could impact health.  
 
4.3 Mediation studies: Health Behaviors 
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Surprisingly, formal tests of whether these potential mediators actually mediate have revealed 
that, at best, mediators only partly account for the personality-mortality relationship. A follow-up 
study of the Termites (Martin, Friedman, & Schwartz, 2007) showed that the effects of childhood 
conscientiousness were not reduced after controlling for later alcohol use, smoking, and 
educational achievement. This study also found that the relationship between adult 
conscientiousness and mortality was only partly reduced, though it was no longer significant. 
Similarly, Terracciano, Löckenhoff, Zonderman, Ferrucci, and Costa (2008) found that smoking 
and obesity did not mediate the relationship between low neuroticism and longevity, and were 
only very slightly involved in the relationship between conscientiousness and longevity. 
Likewise, Nabi and his colleagues (2008) showed only a modest mediation of the relationship 
between neurotic hostility and mortality by the combination of smoking, drinking, and body mass 
index. Also, Chapman, Fiscella, Kawachi, and Duberstein (2010) showed that smoking and 
physical inactivity partly mediated the effects of neuroticism on mortality. On the other hand, 
Weiss, Gale, Batty, and Deary (2009a) found no evidence that the relationship between 
neuroticism and mortality was directly mediated via health behaviors. 
 
The study of inflammatory markers by Sutin et al. (2009) also investigated the possible mediating 
effects of health behaviors including smoking, body mass index, and the use of aspirin. They 
found that the impulsivity facet of neuroticism led to higher interleukin-6 in part via its effect on 
smoking and body mass index. They also found that smoking partly mediated the relationship 
between lower levels of four conscientiousness facets (competence, deliberation, achievement 
striving, and deliberation) and higher levels of interleukin-6. Finally, higher body weight partly 
mediated the relationship between lower scores on the order facet of conscientiousness and 
higher levels of interleukin-6. 
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4.4 Mediation studies: Socioeconomic status 
Most studies on the relationship between personality and health include measures of 
socioeconomic status, such as income and educational achievement. Oddly enough, despite 
this—and by contrast with the situation we described in intelligence-health research—few studies 
have formally tested whether personality-mortality relationships are partly or wholly mediated by 
these variables. One recent exception is the previously described study of neuroticism, cognitive 
ability, and mortality in Vietnam-era veterans by Weiss et al. (2009) who found no evidence that 
the risk posed by higher neuroticism was mediated by education or family income. A second 
exception was the study by Chapman et al. (2010). Their study showed that the effects of 
socioeconomic status on mortality were, in part, explained by the five major personality 
dimensions and that, conversely, the effects of personality were very slightly mediated by their 
effects on socioeconomic status. 
 
4.5 Mediation studies: The patient-health care practitioner relationship 
One potentially important way by which individual differences in cognitive abilities and 
personality may impact health is via their effects on how individuals interact and communicate 
with health-care practitioners. In the case of cognitive abilities, one possibility is that more 
intelligent patients are likely to have larger vocabularies and may have investigated their 
condition before seeing a health care practitioner. As such, they may be better able to 
communicate their symptoms. Similarly, the greater vocabulary of more intelligent patients may 
be better able to understand any advice they are given on how to conceptualize, treat and/or 
manage a health condition.  
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The effects of personality on this relationship may be particularly important, especially given that 
several of the domains and facets of personality may directly or indirectly influence how an 
individual interact with others. This may be especially true in the case of agreeableness. Patients 
who are higher in agreeableness may be more compliant, more willing to place their trust in 
health care practitioners, and more honest and frank in discussing their condition. Conversely, 
individuals who are cynical and distrustful of medical practitioners may be more likely to turn to 
unorthodox and untested treatments, which could be ineffective and even dangerous. It is also 
possible that the effects of intelligence and personality on the relationship are more subtle and 
that intelligent and congenial patients may elicit more empathy from their health care providers.  
 
With respect to the effects of personality, there are findings that support these possibilities. For 
example, of the participants of the Western Electric Study, those who scored higher in a measure 
of cynicism were at greater risk of coronary and all-cause mortality even after controlling for 
several behavioral and physiological risk factors (Almada et al., 1991). Similarly, a large sample 
of 65 to 100 year old Medicare patients also supports this possibility; when examining the facets 
of the five personality factors they found that, even after controlling for several behavioral, 
psychological, and physiological risk factors, that the protective effect of agreeableness was 
underpinned by its straightforwardness facet. 
 
4.6 Moderators 
Another mechanism by which a personality dimension could impact health is by modifying or 
moderating other risk factors whether they are demographic factors, socioeconomic status, health 
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behaviors, or cognitive abilities and other personality dimensions.3 Few studies have examined 
this realm of possibilities, which is surprising particularly as it might help explain some 
inconsistencies within the literature such as why neuroticism is a mortality risk factor in some 
studies and a protective factor in others (see Weiss & Costa, 2005; or Friedman, 2008 for a brief 
review). 
 
Most studies that have examined moderators have looked at interactions among traits, i.e., 
whether certain combinations lead to greater risks than the traits alone could account for. One 
research program which investigated this possibility is that of Type D personality and coronary 
heart disease. In short, a particular combination of traits or personality style marked by high 
neuroticism and low extraversion is a particularly potent risk factor for poorer prognosis in 
patients with coronary heart disease (Denollet, 2005; Denollet et al., 1995; Kupper & Denollet, 
2007). Similarly, in studying mortality risk, Chapman et al. (2010) found that high 
conscientiousness was only a protective factor at high levels of agreeableness. Finally, Weiss et 
al. (2009) found an interaction between neuroticism and intelligence in their study of the Vietnam 
Experience Study cohort. This finding could be interpreted as showing that the protective effects 
of high intelligence was reduced among individuals who were high in neuroticism or that the risk 
posed by high neuroticism was reduced among subjects who were more intelligent (see Figure 4).  
 
5. How Should Future Studies be Designed and Analyzed? 
Our inability to identify consistent and strong mediators of the intelligence-health (though we 
note both the attenuating effects and the possible problems of interpretation with adult 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that it is also possible to examine whether the effects of personality are dependent on other 
factors such as age. For example, Lee, Wadsworth, and Hotopf (2006) showed that anxiety was related to greater 
accident risk among older subjects but reduced accident risk among younger subjects.  
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socioeconomic status) and personality-health associations hampers our ability to understand how 
intelligence and personality affect health. Moreover, we are only beginning to understand how 
intelligence and personality may interact with other health-related predictors. We suggest that 
future studies should focus on identifying and ruling out potential mediators and moderators, 
particularly because they may be modifiable risk factors. Unfortunately, while identifying and 
ruling out possible mediators should be a seemingly simple task, the research to date suggests 
that such variables are elusive at best. As we described earlier, combined, most mediators have 
only partly explained the relationship between personality and health. We should be clear about 
what such a suggestion entails. Many of the cohort studies we described are already heroic—in 
terms of their numbers of subjects, the representativeness to the background population, the 
follow-up period, or the quality of the variables gathered, or some combination of these—and we 
are suggesting that, in addition to high-quality studies that have both predictors (personality 
and/or intelligence) and outcomes (health, broadly conceived), they also include likely mediators 
and moderators. Some studies will have such characteristics—we note the richness of data in the 
Vietnam Experience Study and the British 1958 birth cohort study, for example—there will 
always be limitations, not least because new biomarkers cannot be included in studies until they 
have been identified and can be measured. 
 
5.1 Where are the mediators?: Measurement and socioeconomic status 
Socioeconomic status only accounts for a modest amount of the relationship between personality 
and health, whereas it has a larger attenuating effect with intelligence. One reason that may 
account for this is that socioeconomic status variables such as family income, educational 
achievement, and occupational prestige are poor proxies of a host of specific values, goals, 
desires, and other factors that impact health; and, to an extent, for intelligence. As such, by 
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relying on socioeconomic measures we are only accounting for a very small portion of the true 
link between personality and health. And, with respect to intelligence, the direction of causation 
is unclear, because each attenuates the other’s association with mortality and mental and physical 
ill health (Batty, Der, Macintyre, & Deary, 2006). 
 
5.2 Where are the mediators?: Complex causality 
Another possibility is that the pathways leading from intelligence and personality to health 
outcomes are not as straightforward as assumed by our models (see Friedman, 2008 for a 
discussion). We must therefore ask ourselves whether our theories are adequate or whether we 
require new theories and new models to test them. Before doing this, it is important to review the 
predominant theory and the models used to test that theory. Most present models assume that 
intelligence or some personality trait leads to one or more mediators which subsequently have an 
impact on health outcomes (see Figure 3 and 5a). Whereas there are multiple ways of testing 
these models, the most common way is via a regression-based approach described by Baron and 
Kenney (1986). This approach involves first regressing a factor conceptualized as a mediator. For 
example we may wish to regress education onto intelligence or smoking onto a personality trait 
such as neuroticism. The second step is to regress the health outcome (e.g., mortality) onto 
intelligence or the personality trait. The final step then involves regressing the health outcome 
onto the predictor variable and the mediator. If, in these cases, education mediates the 
relationship between intelligence and mortality, or smoking mediates the relationship between 
personality and mortality, three things should be demonstrated in the results: 1) intelligence must 
be a significant predictor of education, or neuroticism must be a significant predictor of smoking 
in the first regression; 2) intelligence must be a significant predictor of mortality, or neuroticism 
must be a significant predictor of mortality in the second regression; 3) education must predict 
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mortality, or smoking must predict mortality in the second regression, and the effect size of 
intelligence or neuroticism, respectively should be partly or completely reduced (Baron & Kenny, 
1986, p. 1177).  
 
If the relationship between intelligence or personality and health followed this simple mediation 
model, researchers should then be able to understand the mechanisms by which intelligence or 
personality influences health simply by examining plausible (and hopefully well-measured) 
mediators. Unfortunately, this simple model does not appear to be good at capturing the nature of 
the personality-disease relationship (Friedman, 2008) and may also be poor at capturing the 
nature of the intelligence-disease relationship. As such, we hope that researchers turn to other 
models. For example, another way in which personality could impact health is via a chain model 
or what we refer to as a cascade model (see Figure 5b). Here the impact of personality sets off a 
series of events which determine poorer health outcomes. For example, low intelligence could 
lead to poorer diet choices and uninformed health habits which lead to diabetes or atherosclerosis 
and, ultimately, earlier death. This possibility can be examined with an extension of the methods 
described by Baron and Kenny (1986), though other regression-based methods such as sequential 
canonical analysis (Figueredo & Gorsuch, 2007) can also be used to test these models. 
 
A third model is similar to the classic mediation model shown in Figure 5a. However, this model 
does not assume that the relationship between intelligence or personality and the mediators is 
necessarily causal. Instead, intelligence or personality and mediators in this model are believed to 
influence one another (see Figure 5c). This model quite possibly better reflects reality in the 
event that there is no theory specifying causal direction or the theory indicates that causality may 
flow both ways. For example, in the former case, a specific health risk behavior such as smoking 
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likely arises after intelligence or personality differences have developed. In such cases, it would 
make more sense to look at a model similar to that proposed in Figure 5a. However, the case is 
not so simple with variables such as socioeconomic status. As Chapman and his colleagues 
(2010) pointed out, there is sufficient evidence to believe that socioeconomic and personality 
dimensions influence one another. Chapman and his colleagues (2010; Table 2) also 
demonstrated that this can be handled by two sets of the regression approaches described by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). In the first set traits (personality dimensions in their case, though it also 
would apply to intelligence test scores) are treated as predictors and socioeconomic status is 
treated as the mediator. In the second set, this is reversed with socioeconomic status being treated 
as the predictor and the traits as the mediators. With regard to intelligence, such reversal—
intelligence being considered a mediator of socioeconomic influences in health outcomes—has 
been attempted, and found to indicate that, indeed, intelligence—at least, statistically—can 
substantially appear as a mediator between socioeconomic status and morbidity and mortality 
(Batty, Der, Macintyre, & Deary, 2006). 
 
The fourth possible model is also similar to the classic mediation model. However, in this model 
the regressions of mediators onto intelligence or personality traits, and of health onto the 
mediators are random and not fixed effects (see Figure 5d). Thus, whereas each regression 
coefficient (b) has a specific average or mean, there is also between-subject variance in the size 
of the coefficients as denoted by the subscript i. This, therefore, permits the possibility that, 
among some individuals, the relationships between certain mediators and traits as well as the 
relationships between mediators and health outcomes may be stronger or weaker. These 
differences may be related to other characteristics of the participants (e.g., age, sex, or other 
psychological or physical traits) or be unexplained residual variation around the mean effect. 
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Unlike the other models described thus far, testing this model requires the use of statistical 
analyses such as multilevel modeling (see Singer & Willett, 2003 for an exceptionally clear 
treatment) or, in the case of survival data, frailty analysis (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1999). 
 
The fifth model differs from the previous models in that there are no direct or indirect 
relationships between the variables (see Figure 5e). Instead, this model postulates that traits as 
well as the mediators are biomarkers of health. One possible means by which this state of affairs 
may come about is via genetic pleiotropy (Falconer & Mackay, 1996) where a single gene 
influences multiple phenotypes (traits, mediators, and health outcomes in our example). Another 
possibility is that genes for intelligence and personality traits, mediators, and health outcomes are 
close enough on the chromosome so that they are inherited together. Both of these possibilities 
cannot be tested in the same way as the first three models. Moreover, to estimate whether there 
are genetic correlations among variables, one requires a different design than the other models, 
namely one which incorporates data on genetic relatedness such as a twin or family study (Neale 
& Cardon, 1992). Personality may also be a health biomarker for other reasons. For example, it 
may be the case that high levels of circulating hormones may lead to health risks as well as trait 
differences among individuals. 
 
5.3 Where are the mediators?: Confounding 
Finally, as with any non-experimental study examining the relationship between two variables, 
one possibility is that the relationship between personality or intelligence and health are 
confounded by some unmeasured or ‘third’ variable (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In other words, 
some or all of the relationship between the individual differences variables on the one hand and 
health on the other reflects some common cause.  
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In introductory statistics and research classes this is commonly illustrated by discussing the 
correlation between ice cream consumption and drowning. Of course, eating ice cream does not 
cause drowning, but both the amount of ice cream eaten and people entering bodies of water (a 
pre-requisite for drowning) are higher during the summer. With respect to relationship between 
individual differences variables and health, there are several possible mechanisms. For example, 
it may be that the relationship between lower intelligence and poorer health may be explained by 
social deprivation effects which impact both of these variables. In the case of the relationship 
between higher neuroticism and poorer health outcomes, both may be caused by persistent or 
early life stressors.  
 
There are two means by which researchers can rule out the possibility of confounders. The most 
common approach is a regression-based approach in which the researcher runs two separate 
models. In the first model the health outcome is predicted by some individual differences variable 
or variables. In the second model the effect of the individual differences variable or variables are 
tested after statistically controlling for the possible third variable (e.g., socioeconomic status or 
stressful life events). If the effects of any predictor variable decreases or is no longer statistically 
significant, the relationship between this variable or variables and health is said to be confounded 
by the third variable. The second approach, and one which is gaining in popularity, is to use 
covariance structure modeling. This is illustrated in Figure 6 in which a base model which 
specifies that some third variable (III) predicts both the trait of interest and health outcomes via 
paths bT.III and bH.III, respectively, and that health is also predicted by the trait via path bH.T. To 
test whether the effects of the third variable confound the relationship between traits and health, a 
model in which bH.T is free to vary should be compared to a model in which it is fixed to 0. If the 
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models are significantly different, i.e., the model with the pathway between traits and health is 
better, then the effects of the trait on health are not confounded by a third variable. If, on the 
other hand, there is no difference between these models it suggests that the relationship between 
the trait and health, when controlling for the third variable, is not different from 0. That is to say, 
it is confounded by the third variable. An accessible account of this and related issues in the 
context of social inequalities in health is provided by Singh-Manoux (2005). 
 
5.3 Everything in moderation 
Given the large volume of data that exists on intelligence and personality traits and health 
outcomes, it is surprising that not much more work has been done on identifying whether traits 
moderate or are moderated by other traits and risk factors. This is a relatively simple enterprise, 
requiring little additional work than including interaction terms which test specific hypotheses 
concerning these possibilities. Moreover, with the growing number of studies which include 
measures of intelligence (or specific cognitive domains) and/or the five major personality 
dimensions, one can also examine the impact of personality styles, combinations of high or low 
scores on two of the dimensions (Costa & Piedmont, 2003). Using styles may reveal that, for 
example, whereas individuals high in neuroticism are generally more at risk for poor health 
outcomes, this effect may not be true among individuals who, for example, are high in 
intelligence, or in conscientiousness. This last possibility has strength, especially in light of 
evidence that intelligence and personality styles are related to mortality (Chapman et al., 2010), 
cigarette smoking (Terracciano & Costa, 2004), and health risk factors such as depression (Weiss 
et al., 2009b). As such, we would encourage researchers to look beyond the main effects of the 
traits and risk factors they examine in their studies. 
 
 52 
5.4 New studies 
We realize that the possibilities outlined above are daunting, especially if one considers that they 
are not exhaustive. Our point was not to suggest that all possibilities need to be examined, but 
merely to try to explain the relatively modest amount of mediation discovers to date in cognitive 
and personological epidemiology. We feel that it is important to remember the role of theory, 
parsimony, and what is clinically significant. Theory and prior research should be able to rule out 
several possibilities for the relationships between intelligence, personality traits and health. Also, 
whereas complex models may do a better job at explaining relationships, do they explain more 
additional variance than is justified by the loss in elegance or ability to communicate the 
findings? In particular, is the additional information gained likely to be of clinical significance or 
useful to practitioners? 
 
Given that the study of possible mediators and moderators of trait effects on health is in its 
infancy, we recommend first making the search for mediators, either causal or reciprocal, a key 
priority for differential (intelligence and personality) epidemiology. Many existing data sets can 
be used to these ends and re-analyses could yield many important insights. In addition, just as 
genetically informative data sets have been influential in understanding the comorbidity between 
personality traits and major and minor psychiatric disorders (e.g., Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & 
Pedersen, 2006; Ivkovic et al., 2007), these data sets, where possible, should be used to rule out 
or rule in the possibility that intelligence and personality traits are biomarkers for health. 
 
Alongside using existing data, we emphasize to researchers and funding bodies the need to 
incorporate personality and cognitive ability measures in future health studies and especially 
randomized control trials of health interventions. These measures are well-understood, reliable, 
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partly tractable, and highly cost effective in that they can be had at low prices or for free. 
Moreover, they are relevant to health outcomes. Such new studies can either explore the possible 
impact of traits on their intervention, e.g., determine whether providing printed health 
information is more likely to be useful for patients who are higher in intelligence. However, the 
relationship between traits and interventions can also be the focus of the study, e.g., is a specific 
health intervention, say a change in diet, useful in reducing the cardiovascular risk posed by low 
intelligence, or low agreeableness.  
 
We also advocate experimental studies using animal models, especially as traits such as 
personality (Gosling, 2001) and intelligence (Banerjee et al., 2009) can be reliably measured in 
nonhuman species and that the ability to control diet, environmental risk, and other factors could 
help better understand how these traits impact health either directly, indirectly, or in combination 
with other factors. Research in this area has already found that rhesus macaques higher in a trait 
named ‘sociable’ show a greater reduction in viral copies of the simian immunodeficiency virus 
over time (Capitanio, Mendoza, & Baroncelli, 1999), a finding which presaged by nearly a 
decade findings on extraversion and disease progression among humans with HIV (Ironson et al., 
2008). 
 
5.5 New analyses 
To explore plausible mechanisms and analyses, data from new study designs requires appropriate 
analytical techniques. At present, there seemingly are two families of techniques. One family is 
more familiar to epidemiologists and is based on statistics related to regression such as multiple 
regression, general linear models, logistic regression, survival analysis, and multilevel modeling. 
The second family is more familiar to differential psychologists/psychometricians and those 
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studying areas such as program evaluation and behavior genetics. It subsumes regression based 
approaches and other analyses and is commonly referred to as latent variable modeling, 
covariance structure modeling, structural equations modeling, or path analysis (Loehlin, 1998). In 
this approach, relationships among a series of variables are modeled and then fit to the actual data 
set. The goal is to find a set of paths which describes relationships that best fit the data. As such, 
this approach can allow researchers to formally test whether the effects of traits are mediated by 
one or more other variables and whether different mediators are interrelated. Deary (2010) has 
urged a closer integration of these types of analyses, and for more differential psychologists and 
epidemiologists to work more closely together to solve the problems of why intelligence and 
personality are so consistently and strongly associated with morbidity and mortality. 
 
Because the number of possible paths that can be used to relate traits and health variables to each 
other is exceptionally large in many large datasets, we recommend combining these two 
approaches in two steps (see Hart et al., 2003; Chandola et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 2009a for 
examples). First, regression-based approaches are used to identify plausible mediators of a given 
trait or traits and to rule others out. Second, using this information, the relationships among the 
traits, mediators, and outcomes such as mortality are formally modeled and tested. In the latter 
example, we used Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2007), particularly as it allows outcome 
variables to be continuous, categorical, or censored variables, and thus can be readily used with 
much health data.  
 
6. Putting Research into Practice: why should medical practitioners be interested? 
Intelligence and personality traits comprise several characteristics which should make them of 
interest to health researchers and medical practitioners. First, intelligence has many real-world 
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impacts; and the fact that there is agreement between self- and rater-reports of personality traits 
suggests that patients, their family, or, if they are familiar with the patient, the primary care 
providers, could easily assess the personalities of patients using any one of the readily available 
personality measures. Given that these dimensions are human universals, in an increasingly 
diverse society, measures should apply equally to patients from a wide range of backgrounds. 
Moreover, as intelligence and personality are relatively stable in adulthood, a single assessment 
in adulthood would usually be informative over long periods of time.  
 
Whereas knowledge of how traits predict health outcomes is, at present, nascent, we do not 
believe it is too early to speculate about how what we do not and what we might discover could 
be used by health practitioners and policy makers to improve public health. To illustrate we 
propose two thought experiments. First, what could health practitioners and policy makers do 
with information on a patient’s intelligence and personality? Health practitioners who encounter a 
range of patients regularly are most likely aware of differences in their intelligence and 
personalities. However, what could they do with this information? We offer four possibilities, 
though, undoubtedly, many more exist. The first is targeted surveillance: a patient lower in 
intelligence or agreeableness, or who displays a distressed type of personality, could have his or 
her cardiovascular health monitored more regularly. This would be helpful in managing costs as 
regular and costly monitoring would be targeted at those most at risk whereas those at less risk 
could undergo less frequent, albeit still regular, monitoring. Moreover, the increased surveillance 
in those at risk, although costing more in the short run, could lead to large savings to health care 
organizations and societies gained from a reduced likelihood of myocardial infarction. 
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A second possible use of intelligence and personality data on patients would be to tailor and 
develop more effective intervention strategies for particular patients. For example, when faced 
with patients high in conscientiousness, a physician or nurse’s advice to change one’s diet or give 
up smoking would be likely to be met by a high self-directed effort on the part of the patient. 
However, for patients low in conscientiousness, this advice may need to be accompanied with 
short-term incentives and regular monitoring and reminders, or behavior modification either by 
the health care providers or other experts. Similarly, whereas individuals who are high in 
intelligence and conscientiousness could adhere to a complex treatment regimen such as highly 
active antiretroviral therapy, those who are low in both could have difficulties. The contrasting 
long-term survival likelihood of those who are, in childhood, high intelligence-high 
conscientiousness versus those who are low intelligence-low conscientiousness is marked (Deary, 
Batty, Pattie, & Gale, 2008). In these cases, patients in the latter group could be supplied with 
mental prostheses which remind them of when they need to take a particular medication or be the 
recipients of newer, less complex treatments. Again, the additional costs borne by these 
prostheses or newer treatments are likely to be outweighed by a reduction in serious future 
complications and the evolution of resistance. Finally, future findings in pharmacogenetics may 
be able to better match drugs to patients on the bases of their personality and reduce the number 
of side effects and other complications. 
 
A third possible way that personality can improve the patient experience is in helping the 
physician choose drugs which the patient can tolerate. All medications come with potential side 
effects. However, where a range of treatment options exist, physicians could choose the option 
which would least bother or upset a patient. For example, patients high in conscientiousness may 
have more mental resources to tolerate treatments that effect their concentration whereas those 
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who are high in extraversion may be upset if a treatment interferes with their activity levels or 
causes drowsiness. As such, information about personality could not only improve health and 
patient compliance, but also improve patient satisfaction and well-being. 
 
A fourth possible use of these data is to improve relationships between healthcare practitioners 
and patients. These relationships are likely key to better health outcomes in patients and may be 
influenced by personality. For example, patients who are low in agreeableness may need more 
time before they trust nurses or physicians and so this aspect of the relationship could be worked 
on so as to insure better compliance, more disclosure of health problems and complications as 
they arise, and other matters. Similarly, patients high in openness to experience may appreciate 
being provided with more information and a host of treatment options whereas those who are 
closed might prefer unambiguous instructions from their healthcare providers.  
 
Our second thought experiment is to ask how one could tailor personality information for health 
care practitioners. With a large number of patients and other information on their charts, the 
addition of more information would be most beneficial if it was clear, concise, and relevant. We 
suggest simple reports like those of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory which we reproduced 
as Table 1 (Costa & McCrae, 1992) that are often provided to subjects in research studies or to 
possible employers. The report could briefly describe what characteristics are expected by the 
individual based on whether they are low, average, or high in that personality domain. In 
particular, they could be described in ways relevant to health practitioners, i.e., their disposition, 
risk factors for any diseases, and ability to comply with medication regimens. In addition, certain 
personality styles such as those who are high in neuroticism and low in extraversion could be 
flagged as being at much higher risk for specific problems. Such reports could be developed 
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together with physicians and epidemiologists. Moreover, after developing these questionnaires, 
randomized control trials could determine whether physicians provided with this information 
provide better healthcare and have better outcomes than those who are not. 
 
Specifically with regard to intelligence, we do not think it is practicable to emphasize a route that 
goes toward raising intelligence throughout the life course to improve health. Of course, it is 
possible that optimal health and bodily care though life will lead to better intelligence (mental 
capital; Kirkwood, Bond, May, McKeith, & Teh, 2008) in any case. What seems more likely to 
be effective is to encourage phenocopies of high intelligence with respect to health. To the extend 
that we can discover what smart people do to look after their bodies and health and manage their 
illnesses, these strategies can be made widely known and available as valid and useful health care 
rules. The same would apply to the behavioral choices of people with high conscientiousness. 
 
In concluding, we emphasize that it is early in the development of this field for suggested 
interventions. We stressed earlier that there are many new types of studies and analyses that 
require to be done in cognitive and personological epidemiology. However, it is important at this 
early stage that the clear and new findings that link very well established individual differences to 
health outcomes are much more widely known. This foundational knowledge will be important in 
urging researchers and practitioners to include cognitive and personality variables in their work. 
For example, when epidemiologists are planning large scale observational studies and 
interventions they will be encouraged to include intelligence and traits. To date, too many of the 
studies in cognitive and personological epidemiology have been undertaken simply because, by 
luck, there happen to have been personality or intelligence measures assessed in what turned out 
to be a sample that could be linked to health, morbidity, and mortality. It is our aim that, having 
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introduced the strong findings and many unanswered questions in the field, differential 
epidemiology can start to be the subject of studies that take place through design rather than luck. 
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Table 1 
Descriptions of the Five Factor Model personality traits from the middle and both extremes. 
 High scorer Average Low scorer 
Neuroticism Sensitive, 
emotional, and 
prone to experience 
feelings that are 
upsetting 
Generally calm and 
able to deal with 
stress, but you 
sometimes 
experience feelings 
of guilt, anger, or 
sadness 
Secure, hardy, and 
generally relaxed 
even under 
stressful conditions 
Extraversion Extraverted, 
outgoing, and high-
spirited. You prefer 
to be around people 
most of the time. 
Moderate in 
activity and 
enthusiasm. You 
enjoy the company 
of others but you 
also value privacy. 
Introverted, 
reserved, and 
serious. You prefer 
to be alone or with 
a few close friends. 
Conscientiousness Conscientious and 
well-organised. 
You have high 
standards and 
always strive to 
achieve your goals. 
Dependable and 
moderately well-
organised. You 
generally have 
clear goals but are 
able to set your 
work aside. 
Easygoing, and 
sometimes careless. 
You prefer not to 
make plans. 
Agreeableness Compassionate, 
good-natured, and 
Generally warm, 
trusting, and 
Hardheaded, 
sceptical, proud, 
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eager to cooperate 
and avoid conflict. 
agreeable, but you 
can sometimes be 
stubborn and 
competitive. 
and competitive. 
You tend to express 
your anger directly. 
Openness to 
Experience 
Open to new 
experiences. You 
have broad 
interests and are 
very imaginative. 
Practical but 
willing to consider 
new ways of doing 
things. You seek a 
balance between 
the old and the 
new. 
Down-to-earth, 
practical, 
traditional, and 
pretty much set in 
your ways. 
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Table 2 
Facets of the Five Factor Model personality traits. 
Trait Facets 
Neuroticism anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-
consciousness, impulsiveness, 
vulnerability 
Extraversion warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, 
activity, excitement-seeking, positive 
emotions 
Openness fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, 
ideas, values 
Agreeableness trust, straightforwardness, altruism, 
compliance, modesty, tender-mindedness 
Conscientiousness competence, order, dutifulness, 
achievement striving, self-discipline, 
deliberation 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 
From Gunnell et al. (2005): Fully adjusted suicide hazard ratios by categories of logic 
intelligence test score with category 5 as the referent. The same results were apparent for a 
global IQ score. 
 
Figure 2 
From Whitley et al. (2010): Hazard ratio (95% CI) for fight or brawl by IQ adjusted for (a) 
age () and (b) all factors including education (♦). 
 
Figure 3 
From Batty et al. (2007a): A simplified model of influences on pre-morbid IQ and potential 
pathways linking pre-morbid IQ with later mortality. aAlthough psychiatric disease is shown 
as a possible mediating variable between IQ and mortality, it might also be an antecedent 
variable if, for example, suboptimal neurodevelopment were the prior cause of both 
psychiatric disease and early mortality. bNote that system integrity is shown as antecedent to 
both IQ and mortality. In this pathway, lower IQ is not a cause of mortality, but both IQ and 
mortality are influenced by this more fundamental physiological integrity. 
 
Figure 4 
From Weiss et al. (2009): Hazard ratios for combinations of high (+1 SD), average (0 SD), 
and low (-1 SD) levels of Neuroticism (N) and general intelligence (g).  
 
Figure 5 
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Five models showing how the influence of a trait (T) on health (H) may be mediated by other 
variables (Mn). Note that, while traits may directly impact health, this is not assumed in these 
models. The models include a) the classic model commonly used in differential epidemiology. 
The first set of arrows represents the regressions of the three mediators onto the trait. The 
second set of arrows represents regressions of health onto the three mediators; b) the chain or 
cascading model in which the first mediator is regressed onto the trait, the second mediator is 
regressed onto the first mediator, and health is regressed onto the second mediator; c) the 
reciprocal model in which one trait has a reciprocal relationship with two possible mediators 
which influence health outcomes; d) the random effects model where the relationship between 
each individual’s (i) traits and possible mediator variables and those mediator variables and 
health outcomes may differ; e) the biomarker model in which traits, potential mediators, and 
health outcomes are all manifest variables of underlying biological health. 
 
Figure 6 
An illustration of confounding in which a third variable or confound (III) effects both the trait 
(T) and health (H).  
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5a 
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